THE TRUE METHOD

OF ELECTING

THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES:

BEING A

REVIEW OF PAST AND PRESENT SYSTEMS, AND
OF THE SEVERAL PLANS PROPOSED,

AND

SUBMITTING A METHOD MAINTAINING ALL THE VIRTUES OF THE
ELECTORAL SYSTEM, AND ADJUSTING THE PRESIDEN-
TIAL VOTE TO THE POPOULAR VOTE WITH
ALMOST ABSOLUTE EXACTNESS;

TOGETHER WITH

*A Fund of Political Information, and Various Statistical
Facts and Deductions based upon the Popular
and Electoral Votes of 1876.*

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COMMENDATIONS.

DOVER, Ark., October 9, 1877.

Mr. Augustus D. Jones, Little Rock—Dear Sir: * * * * In hearing the manuscript read, I was very favorably impressed as to the merits of your "True Method." I thought its publication would do good, in promoting practical discussion of a question of the gravest concern to every lover of his country. * * * I think your little book should be well received for it original views and excellent style. I wish you well, and hope to hear that your industry and talents have been recognized and rewarded.

Very truly yours,   W. W. MANSFIELD.

THE TRUE METHOD OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ETC.; BY AUGUSTUS D. JONES.

A book bearing the above title, and written at Dover, in this (Pope) county, takes into consideration the system of 1789, with references to the four elections held pursuant thereto; the Twelfth Amendment, with remarks upon the several elections held under its provisions; the proposition to elect the President by popular vote, showing that it is both impracticable and at variance with the theory upon which the Federal Government is founded; the plan of ex-Senator Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, showing wherein it is at fault; also the True Method, which adjusts the Presidential vote of Hayes, Tilden, Cooper and Smith, respectively, to their popular vote with so close an approximation to exactness as to meet all practical requirements, and and allows each State its proper influence in electing the President. The book will contain several interesting tabular statements, demonstrating the author's views. It is free from partisan bias or sectional prejudice, and contains much historical and political information.

We have heard the reading of a manuscript entitiled "The True Method of Electing the President," etc., which we understand the author, Mr. Augustus D. Jones, intends publishing. It is, we believe, the fairest and most practicable plan we have ever seen suggested to prevent the recurrence of another such political storm as the country encountered at the last Presidential election. It would preserve the balance of power between the larger and smaller States, and make such a muddle as the last nearly impossible. We hope the work, when published, will be in the hands of every Congressman.

Senator Garland has introduced in the Senate the memorial of Augustus D. Jones, of this city, asking amendment to the Constitu-

tion as to the manner of electing the President and Vice President. The substance of the proposed amendent is from a work written by Mr. Jones entitled "The True Method." A letter from Col. Cravens, of this district, to the St. Louis Republican on the same subject embodies the views of Mr. Jones.

[From the Little Rock Star, November, 1877.]

We clip the following from the Congressional Globe: "Mr. Garland presented the petition of Augustus D. Jones, of Little Rock, Ark., praying for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States in the manner of electing President and Vice President; referred to the select committee on the subject of the elections of President and Vice President of the United States." Mr. Jones is a compositor in this office, and during his leisure hours has written a thoughtful book on the above subject.,

CONTENTS.

THE TRUE METHOD

OF ELECTING

THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

For many years, public attention has been directed to the palpable errors of the system by which Presidents and Vice Presidents of the United States have been elected from the foundation of the government to the present time, both under the Constitution of 1789 and the Twelfth Amendment, to each of which methods proper attention will be given hereafter. The great objection, however, to either system is NOT that a person failing to receive a majority of the popular vote may, at the same time, be constitutionally chosen President by the Electoral Colleges. This actually occurred in 1844, in 1848, in 1856 and in 1860. Neither Mr. Polk, Gen. Taylor, Mr. Buchanan nor Mr. Lincoln, at his first election, received a popular majority, yet each was constitutionally elected; and in 1876 a person receiving an actual majority of the popular vote failed of an election to the Presidency by the Electoral Colleges. It is not my purpose to complain of that *result*, for I am in no degree governed by a partisan spirit in the investigation of the great question now under consideration, and I only refer to the facts developed as demonstrating conclusively the errors of the present system. The error, however does not grow out of the fact that a majority of the popular votes will not at all times elect the President; but the objection is that the vote of a *State* may so easily be diverted from its proper channel, and that the votes of *all* persons duly qualified in each State are not allowed an influence in the general result. Under the existing law the votes of the *minority* in a State are not heard of in the final

count. For instance, the thousands of Hayes votes in New York and Tilden votes in Illinois were of no avail to either.

The subject under review has engaged the attention of some of the wisest men our country has ever produced—Gen. Jackson, while President, and Thomas H. Benton, while representing Missouri in the United States Senate, being among the number. Gen. Jackson, in each of his eight annual messages to Congress, and Col. Benton, in debate in the Senate, favored the substitution of some other plan for the Electoral system. In addition to these, several other propositions for changing the present mode of procedure have been introduced in Congress and discussed by gentlemen of commanding talent in both Houses, but no proposed amendment to the Constitution which meets the desired end has been submitted by Congress to the several States for their action. Quite recently I observe that Mr. Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, an ex-Senator in Congress, and a gentleman of great learning and ability, has submitted a plan for the election of the President without the intervention of Presidential Electors. Under these circumstances I approach the investigation of the question with some degree of diffidence, and were it not that my position is sustained by the logic of mathematical certainty, I should feel constrained to remain silent and to leave the consideration of the subject to wiser and abler pens. But as, under our free and enlightened institutions, the humblest may aspire to the highest honors, and all may present their views, without hindrance from lawful authority, upon all questions of public interest, I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me, though an unpretending American citizen, to submit a method which, by the closest scrutiny I have been able to give it, assures me that it meets the difficulties surrounding the great question under consideration better than any other that has fallen under my observation. And believing my position and 'theory to be supported by facts of the most incontrovertible nature, I cannot doubt that the views herein presented will meet with at least respectful consideration from an impartial public.

It will be necessary to consider, in the order here stated—

I. The system of 1789, with references to the four elections held pursuant thereto;

II. The Twelfth Amendment, adopted in 1804, with remarks upon the several elections held under its provisions;

III.   The proposition to elect the President by a popular vote of all the people as one community, with an array of facts demonstrating its impracticability;

IV.   The plan of Mr. Buckalew, showing wherein it is an improvement and wherein it fails,

V.   THE TRUE METHOD, showing from the returns of the late Presidential election, that it preserves all the virtues of the Electoral system (allowing each State the proportionate influence in a Presidential election now provided for) and adjusts the Presidential vote of each person voted for upon the basis of his popular vote with almost absolute exactness.

THE SYSTEM OF 1789.

This system was founded upon Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which provides that "each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors equal to its whole number of Senators and Representatives in the Congress," and the Constitution in this particular is now as it was in the beginning; but prior to the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment each Presidential Elector voted for two persons for President, one of whom might be chosen to that office and the other Vice President. Under that system four different elections were held.

At the first election the public mind had settled upon the Father of his Country as the proper person for the Chief Magistracy of the infant republic, and he received a unanimous vote of the Electors. In addition to Washington eleven other persons received votes for President, and one State (Georgia), with five Electors, voted for five different persons. Next to Washington's vote, that for John Adams was the highest, and he became Vice President, although he did not receive a majority of all the Electoral votes cast. The Vice President was not voted for directly, but with public sentiment so nearly unanimous in Washington's favor, if not entirely so, the votes cast for Adams, Clinton, Jay and others must have been given only in the expectation of securing the Vice Presidency.

At the second election (1792) Washington was re-elected by a unanimous vote, and only four other persons were voted for, one of whom received but four votes and another one vote, showing that even at that early day the public mind had begun to concentrate in

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regard to the two highest officers provided for by the Constitution. Adams received seventy-seven votes, which was the next highest vote to that for Washington, and became Vice President for the second term.

At the third election (1796), when it became necessary to choose Washington's successor, I find that in sixteen States no less than thirteen persons were voted for as President, yet the public mind was quite evenly balanced between Adams and Jefferson—the former receiving seventy-one and the latter sixty-eight. Adams became President and Jefferson Vice President, though each was supported by men of contrary political views. This was one of the anomalous results of which the system admitted; and had Adams received two votes less and Jefferson two more, Adams would have been elected Vice President for the third term.

When, in 1801, the two Houses of Congress met to witness the count of the Electoral votes cast, it was found that Jefferson and Burr had seventy-three votes each; Adams sixty-five and Pinckney sixty-four—showing that Jefferson and Burr were almost as clearly pitted against Adams and Pinckney as Hayes and Wheeler were against Tilden and Hendricks. There being a tie between Jefferson and Burr, it devolved upon the House of Representatives to elect one of them as the President, the other to be Vice President. Each of the sixteen States at that time comprising the Union having one vote, it required nine States to elect. The first ballot stood eight States for Jefferson, four for Burr, and two States in which the represetation was equally divided. This resulted in a "dead-lock" which the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution had not provided for, and affairs assumed a threatening aspect. The balloting continued from the eleventh to the seventeenth of February, 1801, when, on the thirty-sixth ballot, Jefferson was elected. Had the "dead-lock" continued until the fourth of March, the United States would have been without either a President or Vice President. In order to provide against such a difficulty thereafter the Twelfth Amendment was adopted, and is embodied in the Constitution as Article XII.

THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT.

Article XII, commonly called the Twelfth Amendment, preserves the system of choosing Presidents and Vice Presidents of the United

States by and through the agency of Presidential Electors, but provides that Electors shall designate, in separate ballots, one person for President and another for Vice President. With the exception of the election of John Quincy Adams as President by the House of Representatives in 1825 and of Richard M. Johnson as Vice President by the Senate in 1837, all the Presidents and Vice Presidents have been chosen by a majority of the Electors from the time of Jefferson's second election to and including the election of 1876.

Upon an examination of the returns, I find that from 1804 to 1820, inclusive, Presidents and Vice Presidents received such decisive majorities of the Electors that each result must have been in accord with the popular wish. In 1824, however, when Mr. Monroe's successor was to be elected, it was found that the public mind had not settled in favor of any one person with sufficient force to tide him over the shoals of the Electoral system. Gen. Jackson was undoubtedly the choice of the greatest number of the people, and of the Electors he received the highest vote (ninety-nine), but fell thirty-two short of the number necessary to secure his election. John Quincy Adams received the next highest number of votes, and William H. Crawford the next.

The choice of one of these for President devolved upon the House of Representatives, each *State* to have one vote. Adams received thirteen States, which was a majority, and secured his election. In this case the contest was decided by the vote of the solitary member from Missouri, which offset the vote of Pennsylvania, with twenty-six Representatives. The result was not satisfactory to the majority of the people, but it was strictly constitutional, and there was no remedy.

For twenty years after the election of Mr. Adams in the manner stated, the Electoral Colleges chose Presidents who had received popular majorities. But in 1844 Mr. Polk, and in 1848 Gen. Taylor, failed of a popular majority, though duly and constitutionally elected. Mr. Buchanan was also a "minority" President, and so was Mr. Lincoln, at his first election, when he received less than forty per cent of the popular vote. In 1864 Mr. Lincoln received a popular majority, and so did Gen. Grant at both his elections. In the several instances of "minority" Presidents mentioned, the successful candidate received at least a plurality of the popular vote; but in 1876 the devia-

tion of the Electoral result from the popular vote was so great that a person receiving an actual majority of the popular vote failed of an election according to the forms of law.

As frequent reference must be had to the returns of the election of 1876, I here insert a tabular statement of the popular vote, which I believe to be generally correct—at least so nearly so as to meet all . practical requirements. The Electoral count is that officially declared before the two Houses of Congress:

TABLE A.

POPULAR AND ELECTORAL VOTES OF 1876.

STATES.	ELECTORS. Hayes.	ELECTORS. Tilden.	ELECTORS. Total.	THE POPULAR VOTE. Hayes.	THE POPULAR VOTE. Tilden.	THE POPULAR VOTE. Coop'r	THE POPULAR VOTE. Smith.	THE POPULAR VOTE. Total.
Alabama	....	10	10	68,320	106,213	......	....	174,533
Arkansas.....	...	6	6	38,669	58,033	211	......	96,913
California.....	6	...	6	78,614	75,855	44	......	154,243
Colorado	3	...	3	14,154	13,316	......	......	27,470
Connecticut...	....	6	6	59,034	61,934	744	378	122,090
Delaware......	....	3	3	10,691	13,379	......	......	24,070
Florida	4	...	4	23,849	22,923	......	......	46,772
Georgia.......	....	11	11	49,354	129,785	......	......	179,139
Illinois.........	21	....	21	278,232	258,601	18,421	437	555,690
Indiana	....	15	15	208,111	213,526	9,533	......	431,170
Iowa.........	11	...	11	171,826	112,099	9,001	36	292,693
Kansas	5	...	5	78,332	37,902	7,776	133	124,143
Kentucky.....	....	12	12	97,490	150,108	2,003	898	250,499
Louisiana......	8	...	8	95,135	70,556	......	......	165,691
Maine........	7	...	7	66,300	49,914	663	......	116,877
Maryland.....	....	8	8	71,891	91,780	......	......	163,671
Massachus'tts	13	...	13	150,078	108,975	873	......	259,926
Michigan	11	...	11	166,534	141,190	9,060	839	317,623
Minnesota ...	5	...	5	72,692	48,799	2,389	......	123,880
Mississippi...	....	8	8	51,853	108,241	......	......	160,094
Missouri......	....	15	15	145,029	207,077	3,492	277	355,875
Nebraska	3	...	3	31,915	17,554	2,320	1,599	53,388
Nevada.......	3	...	3	10,286	9,196	......	......	19,482
N. Hampshire	5	...	5	41,522	38,440	76	......	80,038
New Jersey..	....	9	9	103,507	115,956	712	43	220,218
New York...	....	35	35	489,505	522,043	2,039	2,359	1,015.946
N. Carolina..	....	10	10	106,402	122,580	......	......	228,982
Ohio	22	...	22	330,689	323,182	3,057	1,712	658,640
Oregon.......	3	...	3	15,414	14,157	510	4	30,085
Pennsylvania.	29	...	29	384,184	366,204	7,204	1,401	758,993
Rhode Island	4	...	4	15,787	10,712	60	......	26,559
S. Carolina...	7	..	7	91,870	90,906	......	......	182,776
Tennessee ...	....	12	12	89,566	133,166	......	......	222,732
Texas	....	8	8	44,552	103,613	......	......	148,165
Vermont	5	...	5	44,091	20,354	......	......	64,445
Virginia	....	11	11	95,595	139,670	......	......	235,265
W. Virginia..	....	5	5	42,698	56,455	1,373	......	100,526
Wisconsin ...	10	...	10	130,070	123,690	1,809	32	255,601
Total.........	185	184	369	4,063,842	4,287,814	83,370	10,148	8,445,174

Whether the returns of the popular vote, given above, are as exactly correct or not is wholly immaterial, and admitting, for the sake of argument, that they are not so, I may, nevertheless, base all my conclusions upon them with entire safety, for they prove the possibility of such a result at any time in a close contest, with a system like that now in vogue; indeed, under any system, except the popular vote plan, a person may receive a majority of the votes of the people, and still fail of an election. Of this I do not complain; my objections to the Electoral system are based upon other considerations; but of these more hereafter.

By the returns of 1876, I find the whole popular vote to have been 8,445,174, of which Hayes received 4,063,842, Tilden 4,287,814, Cooper 83,370, Smith 10,148, Tilden over Hayes, 223,972; Tilden over all, 130,454; yet Hayes was elected. The returns might have shown a much larger majority for Tilden, without any change in the general result. Suppose that 1500 in California, 9000 in Illinois, 29,000 in Iowa, and 20,000 in Kansas, had been taken from Hayes and given to Tilden—the result would have been the same; and changes of less magnitude in other Hayes States might have been made, with increased majorities for Tilden in the States which he carried, so as to give him an excess over Hayes of a million popular votes, and still the final result would have been unchanged.

With the possibility of a person being elected President without receiving a popular majority, why, it may be asked, was the Electoral system adopted? I answer that it was to satisfy what many of the ablest and wisest statesmen regard as a just demand of the small States for a greater relative influence than the large States in the election of Presidents and Vice Presidents. The small States demanded and obtained an equal representation with the large States in the Senate, and it is expressly declared in the Constitution that no State shall be deprived of an equal representation in the Senate without its consent. Without these concessions, the Union could not have been formed; and shall the very principle upon which the Union stands be disregarded now? In addition to what has been said, I will assert, without fear of successful contradiction, that the United States Government is one of limited powers. The Tenth Amendment declares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the

States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Who delegated the powers above referred to? Certainly not the people of the United States as one community, but the people of the States respectively, and they are the people referred to wherever the people are mentioned in the Constitution. Indeed, the people of the United States, as one community, exercise no control whatever over the government of the United States. They can only be heard through their respective *State* organizations. The preamble to the Constitution says : "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, * * * * do ordain and establish this Constitution," etc. In accordance with the sentiment of the framers of the Constitution, it was proposed to insert the names of the States in the preamble, so as to make it read something like this : "The States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts," etc., etc., "do ordain and establish this Constitution," but the objection to this phraseology was that possibly all the States of the old Confederation might not accede to the Union at all, and so the present form was adopted.

Article I, section 1, declares that "the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the *people* of the several *States*, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the *State* Legislature." Thus are the *States* to determine, each for itself, what shall be the qualifications of voters for Representatives in Congress. The "people" are mentioned, also, in the First Amendment, which declares that "Congress shall make no law * * * abridging * * * the right of the people peaceably to assemble," etc.; the Second Amendment declares that "a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free *State*, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;" the Fourth Amendment says "the right of the people to be secure in their persons * * shall not be violated;" and the Ninth Amendment is in these words of weighty import : "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." What people were referred to in these several amendments? By any fair construction, and by necessary implication, the people of the several *States* were so referred to.

No law can be found which gives the people of the United States any authority in the administration of the Federal Government ex-

cept through their respective *State* organizations, and only in the Lower House of Congress is representation based upon population, and the members of that body are chosen from districts formed and controlled by *State* authority. In the House "all bills for raising revenue must originate, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills;" and the House has "the sole power of impeachment." In these only the people, through the House of Representatives, have the advantage. But look at the Senate, and see how far its powers exceed those of the House. In effect, no law has ever passed Congress without the sanction of the States, through the equal representation of each in the Senate; the Senate rejects or confirms all nominations of Cabinet officers, Foreign Ministers, Judges of the United States Courts, and other high officers; it rejects or ratifies treaties with foreign powers; and by the Senate all civil officers, even Judges of the Supreme Court or the President himself, may be removed from office on impeachment, and from its decision in such cases there is no appeal.* It will be seen, then, that the people exercise no control over the government except through their State organizations, and only in the House is there anything like equality, and that body has no power whatever over the vast interests before

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*Senator Sumner, in his opinion on the impeachment trial of President Johnson, used this language: "Something has been said of the people, now watching our proceedings with patriotic solicitude, and it has been proclaimed that they are wrong to intrude their judgment. I do not think so. This is a political proceeding, which the people at this moment are as competent to decide as the Senate." On this historic occasion, when the States, through their Senators, exercised the very highest functions, and the most momentous issues were involved, all the Senators from California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island and Vermont, with a population of 12,278,383 in 1870 (say 12,000,000 at the time of the impeachment trial, 1868) voted the President guilty. Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland and Tennessee, with a population of about 3,000,000 in 1868, voted that he was not guilty as charged in the articles of impeachment. In Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Wisconsin, with a population of about 14,000,000 people in 1868, the Senators were divided—one off-setting the other in each State. The population of the twenty-seven States then having Senators in Congress was about 29,000000. Adding half the population of the States that divided their votes to one side and one-half to the other, and the count would stand: guilty, 19,000,000; not guilty, 10,000,000. Yet the President was acquitted. In fact, the States of Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin, with a population of about 2,500,000, could have prevented the removal of the President, even though all the other States, with 26,500,000 of population, had voted him guilty. Hence, it will be seen that the States, and not the people at large, decide questions of the greatest magnitude.

mentioned, they being confided exclusively to the Senate, in which each State, without regard to population, wealth or resources, has an equal voice. In order, therefore, that the Constitution might harmonize in all its provisions, a system of electing the President and Vice President was adopted whereby State equality and the popular voice were so adjusted that neither should unwarrantably encroach upon the other; but, for reasons already given and to be given hereafter, the system has failed. The main principle upon which it was founded, however, is eminently correct. It was a compromise between two extremes—one insisting upon an equal voice by each State, the other contending for an election by popular vote. Thus was the Electoral system adopted. That it has failed is not because it gives the small States a greater relative influence in the election of Presidents than the large States : in this is found its great virtue.

No two States exercise the same relative influence in electing the President, as will be seen by the following table, based upon the returns for 1876, showing the ratio of each State (which is found by dividing the number of popular votes in a State by its Electoral vote); the per cents of the popular and Electoral votes, and the gain or loss to each State by the Electoral system instead of the popular vote :

TABLE B.

RATIO AND PER CENT.

STATE RATIO OF POPULAR VOTES TO ONE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR.	Per Cent Pop. Vote.	Per Cent Elec. Vote	Gain.	Loss.
Alabama 17,453	2.06	2.71	24.00	.....
Arkansas 16,152	1.14	1.62	29.63	.....
California 25,707	1.82	1.62	.....	12.34
Colorado 9,156	0.32	0.81	60.49	.....
Connecticut 20,348	1.44	1.62	11.11	.....
Delaware 8,023	0.28	0.81	65.43	.....
Florida........................11,693	0.55	1.08	49.07	.....
Georgia........................16,285	2.12	2.98	28.92	.....
Illinois 26,461	6.57	5.69	.....	15.46
Indiana 28,745	5.15	4.06	.....	26.84
Iowa 26,633	3.46	2.98	.....	16.11
Kansas 24,829	1.47	1.35	.....	8.98
Kentucky 20,875	2.97	3.25	8.61	.....
Louisiana 20,711	1.96	2.16	9.45	.....

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Table B—Continued.

STATE RATIO OF POPULAR VOTES TO ONE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR.		Per Cent Pop. Vote.	Per Cent Elec. Vote	Gain.	Loss.
Maine	16,697	1.38	1.89	27.00	.....
Maryland	20,459	1.94	2.16	10.18	.....
Massachusetts	19,994	3.04	3.51	13.39	.....
Michigan	28,875	3.76	2.98	......	26.17
Minnesota	24,776	1.46	1.35	......	8.15
Mississippi	20,012	1.89	2.16	12.50	.....
Missouri	23,725	4.21	4.06	......	3.56
Nebraska	17,796	0.63	0.81	22.22	.....
Nevada	6,494	0.23	0.81	71.60	.....
New Hampshire	16,007	0.94	1.35	30.37	.....
New Jersey	23,357	3.61	2.44	......	6.96
New York	29,027	12.04	9.48	......	27.00
North Carolina	22,898	2.71	2.71	......	.....
Ohio	29,919	7.82	5.96	......	31.20
Oregon	10,028	0.25	0.81	56.79	.....
Pennsylvania	26,174	8.91	7.85	......	13.50
Rhode Island	6,640	0.31	1.08	71.29	.....
South Carolina	26,111	2.16	1.89	.....	14.18
Tennessee	18,561	2.64	3.25	18.77	.....
Texas	18.521	1.52	2.16	29.63	.....
Vermont	12,889	0.76	1.35	43.70	.....
Virginia	21,388	2.71	2.98	9.06	.....
West Virginia	20,105	1.19	1.35	11.85	.....
Wisconsin	25,560	3.03	2.71	......	11.80

The per cent of the popular vote will vary with each election; the per cent of the Electoral vote every ten years. At the late election Nevada threw the least number of popular votes; New York the greatest. New York cast over fifty-two times as many popular votes as Nevada, but not twelve times as many Electoral votes. Rhode Island exercised the greatest relative influence in the election of 1876; Ohio the least. Ohio cast over twenty-four times as many popular votes as Rhode Island, but only five and a-half times as many Electoral votes.

The average gain in eleven Hayes States was 41.4 per cent; average loss in ten Hayes States, 15.8 per cent. Average gain in twelve Tilden States, 21.64 per cent; average loss in four Tilden States, 16.09 per cent. One Tilden State (North Carolina) neither gained nor lost.

ELECTION BY POPULAR VOTE.

I feel certain that the proposition to elect the President by the votes of the people of all the States as one community would be rejected—each State having an equal voice in the ratification or rejection of a constitutional amendment, and three-fourths of the States being necessary to secure ratification. Nevertheless, a few facts bearing upon this branch of the subject cannot be out of place. The great danger to he apprehended from the popular vote theory is that one group of States may combine and overpower all the other States. That this danger is not without some foundation, the facts to be submitted will abundantly prove. Take the eight States of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa, all composed of contiguous territory, as an illustration. I find that in 1876 they cast 4,286,527 popular votes—a majority of 63,490 over all the other States; in these eight States Hayes received over 53 per cent of his popular vote, and over 56 per cent of his Electoral vote. These States have—

Of popular votes......................................over 50.80 per cent
Of Senators in Congress..............................over 20.05 per cent
Of Representatives in Congress................nearly 47.10 per cent
Of Electors under the present law, or Presidential
    votes under either the Buckalew plan or the True
    Method .... 41.47 per cent
  Add Missouri to the list, and the nine States have—
Of popular votes.............................nearly 55.03 per cent
Of Senators in Congress.......................over 23.68 per cent
Of Representatives in Congress................over 51.52 per cent
Of Electors...................................nearly 45.81 per cent
  Bring in Massachusetts, and the ten States have—
Of popular votes.............................over 58.14 per cent
Of Senators in Congress......................over 26.31 per cent
Of Representatives in Congress...............over 55.29 per cent
Of Electors..................................over 49.32 per cent
  Adding Maryland, and the eleven States, all composed of contiguous territory, have—
Of popular votes.............................over 60.05 per cent
Of Senators in Congress......................over 29.00 per cent
Of Representatives in Congress...............nearly 57.34 per cent
Of Electors..................................nearly 51.52 per cent

In these eleven States Hayes received nearly 62 per cent of the Electoral vote.

Further to illustrate the great difference between the popular vote theory and any system which gives the small States greater relative influence than those of greater voting power, the several States are placed in groups, in the order of their heaviest popular vote in 1876 together with the number of Electors to which each, is now ntitled :

GROUP I,	Electors.	GROUP II.	Electors.	GROUP III,	Electors.
1 New York	35	13 North Carolina	10	26 Connecticut	6
2 Pennsylvania	29	14 Tennessee	12	27 Maine	7
3 Ohio	22	15 New Jersey	9	28 West Virginia	5
4 Illinois	21	16 South Carolina	7	29 Arkansas	6
5 Indiana	15	17 Georgia	11	30 N. Hampshire	5
6 Missouri	15	18 Alabama	10	31 Vermont	5
7 Michigan	11	19 Louisiana	8	32 Nebraska	3
8 Iowa	11	20 Maryland	8	33 Florida	4
9 Massachusetts	13	21 Mississippi	8	34 Oregon	3
10 Wisconsin	10	22 California	6	35 Colorado	3
11 Kentucky	12	23 Texas	8	36 Rhode Island	4
12 Virginia	11	24 Kansas	5	37 Delaware	3
		25 Minnesota	5	38 Nevada	3
Total	205	Total	107	Total	57
Pop. vote, 5,287,921.		Pop. vote, 2,348,540.		Pop. vote, 808,713.	

Should the popular vote theory be adopted, the voting power of the first group would be raised from 55.55 to 62.61—a difference in favor of the large States of 12.7 per cént. The strength of the second group would be reduced from 29.00 to 27.64, entailing a loss of 4.07 per cent. The voting power of the third groupe would be reduced from 15.44 to 9.57, and a loss of over 38 per cent would be the result. The States in the third groupe have twenty-six of the seventy-six Senators, and by voting in unison could defeat any proposed amendment in the Senate, a two-third vote being necessary. The ten States least in voting power, from Arkansas to Nevada, both inclusive, have 10.57 per cent of the Electors and 5.48 per cent of the popular vote. Therefore, in an election by popular vote, their voting power would be reduced 48.15 per cent; yet these ten States, either by non-action or adverse action, may defeat the ratification of any amendment submitted by Congress to the States, as an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of all the States before it can become a part of the Constitution.

I find, also, that the six New England States, together with New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota, all composed of contiguous territory, cast 5,080,472 votes in 1876; the other States 3,364,702. A million majority for one person in those States would not be relatively greater than the majority for Hayes in Kansas, Rhode Island or Vermont, or for Tilden in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky or Mississippi. A million plurality in the New England States, together with New York, Pennsylvania, etc., would be equal to five hundred and ninety-

eight in every one thousand votes, while it would require in the other States six hundred and fifty in every one thousand votes to overcome it. It may be said that there is no danger, under such circumstances, of a combination between those States in order to control a Presidential election. How that might be, if the election was submitted to popular vote, I cannot say; I do know that in three of the Presidential elections held since 1860 these fifteen States, beginning with Maine and extending south and west to and including Iowa, gave pluralities for the same person at each election. Improbable as any such combination may appear, it is yet more improbable that New Jersey and Texas, or Delaware and Nevada, or North Carolina and Nebraska, or Arkansas and California, or Louisiana and Oregon, would or could form a combination, even in mutual sef-defense, against States all composed of contiguous territory. Furthermore, the election by popular vote would deprive the small States of that preponderating influence in Presidential elections without which the Union could never have been formed. It is at war with the whole theory upon which the Federal Government is founded, and the adoption of the popular vote plan would be the most dangerous step in the direction of centralization that the country has yet witnessed. (The question will be referred to again.)

THE BUCKALEW PLAN.

"The plan of electing a President advocated by Mr. Buckalew, of Pennsylvania," says the Missouri Republican, "does away with the Electors, and provides that the people shall vote directly for Presidential candidates. The States will not have Electors, but will have Electoral votes—each as many as the number of its Representatives and Senators in Congress; but, instead of all those votes being cast for that candidate who shall carry the State, they are to be divided between the two or more candidates in proportion to the number of popular votes they shall receive, respectively. * * * * For example, in the late Presidential election, Missouri voted 203,077 for Tilden 145,029 for Hayes, Tilden's majority being 58,048, and all the fifteen votes of Missouri, therefore, being awarded to him. * * * Under the Buckalew proposition, the aggregate Presidential vote of Missouri, 348,106, would be divided by fifteen, the number of Electoral votes the State is entitled to, and the resulting number, 23,207, would be the Electoral ratio for the State. Dividing Tilden's popular vote (203,077) by this would give eight ratios and more than a half over, and the scheme provides that when the fraction of a ratio is more than half it shall count one. Tilden, therefore, would receive nine of the Electoral votes of Missouri and Hayes six."

This is the gist of the proposition, so far as developed in the Republican's article, and pursuant thereto I have made up a tabular statement (based upon the returns of 1876) showing what the Presidential result would have been under the Buckalew plan, viz.:

TABLE C—*The Result of 1876 under the Buckalew Plan.*

STATES.	Total Pop. Vote.	PLURALITIES.		Hayes.	Tilden.
		Hayes.	Tilden.		
Alabama	174,533	......	37,893	4	6
Arkansas	96,913	......	19,364	2	4
California	154,243	3,029	......	3	3
Colorado	27,470	838	......	2	1
Connecticut	122,090	......	2,900	3	3
Delaware	24,070	......	2,678	1	2
Florida	46,772	926	......	2	2
Georgia	179,139	......	80,521	3	8
Illinois	555,691	19,631	......	11	10
Indiana	431,170	......	5,415	7	8
Iowa	202,963	59,728	......	7	4
Kansas	124,143	41,430	......	3	2
Kentucky	250,499	......	52,618	5	7
Louisiana	165,691	24,579	......	5	3
Maine	116,877	16,386	......	4	3
Maryland	163,761	......	19,799	4	4
Massachusetts	259,926	41,103	......	8	5
Michigan	317,623	25,444	......	6	5
Minnesota	123,880	23,893	......	3	2
Mississippi	160,094	......	56,288	3	5
Missouri	355,875	......	58,048	6	9
Nebraska	53,388	14,361	......	2	1
Nevada	19,482	1,080	......	2	1
New Hampshire	80,038	2,082	......	3	2
New Jersey	220,218	......	12,499	4	5
New York	1,015,946	......	32,538	17	18
North Carolina	228,982	......	16,178	5	5
Ohio	658,640	7,507	......	11	11
Oregon	30,085	1,257	......	2	1
Pennsylvania	758,993	17,980	......	15	14
Rhode Island	26,559	5,085	......	2	2
South Carolina	182,776	984	......	4	3
Tennessee	222,732	......	43,600	5	7
Texas	148,165	......	59,061	2	6
Vermont	64,445	23,737	......	3	2
Virginia	235,265	......	44,075	4	7
West Virginia	100,526	......	13,577	2	3
Wisconsin	255,601	6,386	......	5	5
Total	8,445,174			180	189

The footing up shows a close approximation to the true result, but that this is owing to fortuitous circumstances rather than to perfection in the Buckalew plan, I undertake to make apparent to any one who will follow me in the investigation.

REMARKS ON THE BUCKALEW PLAN.

I.   Illinois gave Hayes 278,232, Tilden 258,601, Cooper 18,421, Smith 437—total, 555,691; ratio, 26,461.   Dividing Hayes' vote by the ratio, I find him entitled to ten Presidential votes, with 13,522 popular votes over, which is 287 more than half the ratio, and gives him another vote.   Tilden scores ten votes by allowing him one for his fraction of 22,315—more than 9,000 over half the ratio.   In effect, then, 287 popular votes gave Hayes an extra Presidential vote, while over 9,000 cast for Tilden were of no avail whatever.   However, as Hayes led Tilden nearly 20,000, the apportionment of eleven to ten is a fair one.   But suppose Hayes had received 300 popular votes less than he did, so as to leave his fraction below half a ratio, he could then have counted only ten to Tilden's ten, though still ahead of him 19,000 or 20,000.   What would become of the odd vote in that case?   Should it go to Hayes, when Cooper received more votes than Hayes' fraction amounted to?

II.   Indiana gave Hayes 208,111, Tilden 213,536, Cooper 933—total, 431,170; ratio, 28,744.   Hayes is entitled to seven votes, with 6,903 over; Tilden seven, with 12,318 over.   Neither Hayes nor Tilden having a fraction equal to half a ratio, what is to be done with the odd vote?   I suppose Tilden has the best right to it.

III.   Iowa gave Hayes 171,827, Tilden 112,099, Cooper 9,001, Smith 36.   Hayes gets six votes, with a fraction over of 12,029, which is less than half a ratio.   Tilden is entitled to four votes without dispute; but an extra vote must be given to Hayes in order to "force" a balance.   Indiana and Iowa are parallel cases, and one happily offsets the other; but suppose the plurality in each State had been in favor of the same person, and the general result had depended on those two States, what then?   Would not such a contingency lead to a serious complication?

IV.   Kansas gave Hayes 78,332, Tilden 39,902, Cooper and Smith 7,809—total, 124,143; ratio, 24,826.   Hayes scores three, with 3,844 popular votes thrown away.   Tilden gets two votes, one being allowed for a fraction of 663 more than half a ratio.   Hayes gets

nearly two to one over Tilden in popular votes, but only three to his two on the Presidential count.

V. Maryland is a most anomalous case. Hayes received 71,981 to 91,780 for Tilden—total, 163,761; ratio, 20,470. Hayes gets three votes, with an extra one for a fraction of 10,571, which is 336 more than half a ratio. Only four votes remain for Tilden, although he ran nearly 20,000 ahead of Hayes. Such a result may not often be obtained, but a system which admits of it in any case is certainly at fault.

VI. Massachusetts gave Hayes 150,078, Tilden 108,975, Cooper 873—total, 259,926. Hayes gets eight votes by allowing him one for a fraction of 10,120 (the ratio being 19,994), only 123 more than half the ratio. Tilden gets five votes, but over 9,000 of his popular votes are of no avail. Had 150 of Hayes' votes gone over to Cooper or Smith, so as to reduce Hayes' fraction below half a ratio, it would have presented another Indiana or Iowa case, and a "forced" balance would have become necessary.

VII. Nebraska is another anomaly. Hayes had 31,915, Tilden 17,754, Cooper and Smith 3,919—total, 53,588; ratio, 17,862. Hayes gets two votes, by allowing him one for a fraction nearly up to the full ratio. But who shall have the other Presidential vote, Tilden's popular vote being less than the ratio? If it should go to Tilden, his fraction being the largest, why not allow Cooper a vote in Illinois, where he received a larger popular vote than the fraction for either Tilden or Hayes? In order to balance the account, the odd vote is awarded to Tilden.

VIII. North Carolina presents a like case to Maryland. Hayes gets five votes, one being allowed for a fraction of 14,820, being 3,471 more than half the ratio. The total vote of the State was 106,402 for Hayes and 122,580 for Tilden, whose majority is 16,178; but only five votes remain for him.

IX. Ohio makes a happy off-set to North Carolina; but suppose the pluralities were in favor of the same person, and the general result hinged on those two States, what then? Ohio gave Hayes 330,-689, Tilden 323,182, and others 4,769—total, 658,640; ratio, 29,938. Hayes gets eleven votes, his fraction being only 1,309 over half a ratio, while Tilden gets eleven, one being added for his fraction.

X. Rhode Island gave Hayes 15,787, Tilden 10,712, Cooper 60—total, 26,559; ratio, 6,640. Hayes gets two Presidential votes, with

2,507 popular votes thrown away; Tilden two, by allowing him an extra vote for his fraction of 752 over half the ratio. Hayes gets over fifty-nine per cent of the popular vote, but only fifty per cent of the Presidential vote.

XI. In South Carolina Hayes gets 52.26 per cent of the popular vote, and 59.14 per cent of the Presidential vote.

XII. Vermont is an off-set to South Carolina, Hayes getting 68.5 per cent of the popular vote, and only sixty per cent of the Presidential vote. But suppose one did not offset the other : in that case the rule would not work out a proper result.

XIII. Virginia gave Hayes 95,595, Tilden 139,670—total, 235,-265; ratio, 21,387. Hayes scores four Presidential votes, with 10,047 popular votes over, it being 597 below half the ratio. Tilden scores seven by allowing him one extra vote for a fraction only 744 over half the ratio. Four hundred popular votes taken from Tilden and given to Hayes would have given the latter another Presidential vote.

XIV. Wisconsin gave Hayes 6,140 more popular votes than Tilden, but the Presidential vote is five to five.

Notwithstanding these discrepancies, the Buckalew plan works out a fair result, but that such a result was due to mere chance I undertake to establish conclusively. According to the returns of 1876, the States of California, Florida, Ohio, Rhode Island and Wisconsin gave Hayes pluralities of 24,017 over Tilden on the popular vote, and each receives, under the Buckalew plan, twenty-three Presidential votes. Connecticut, Maryland and North Carolina gave Tilden pluralities of 38,878 over Hayes, and each has twelve Presidential votes. Tilden being only 14,860 ahead in these eight States, he suffers no great loss by the apportionment of thirty-five Presidential votes to each. But, had all the pluralities been in Tilden's favor, his excess of popular votes would have been 62,994, and the Buckalew plan would have worked out the same Presidential result; though an adjustment under the True Method would foot up about thirty-six for Tilden to thirty-four for Hayes—a difference quite sufficient to change the general result where parties are nearly divided evenly.

Assuming the popular vote to have been as follows in the thirteen States below mentioned, the Presidential result under the Buckalew plan would have been sixty to sixty :

4

TABLE D.

SHOWING THE RESULT ON ASSUMED RETURNS.

STATES.	Hayes.	Tilden.	Hayes' Majority.	Tilden's Majority.
Alabama	95,965	78,568	17,397	
California	89,000	65,533	24,467	
Connecticut	71,200	50,890	20,110	
Florida	29,170	17,602	11,568	
Kentucky	114,819	135,650		20,801
Louisiana	72,547	93,144		20,597
Maryland	92,080	71,681	20,399	
North Carolina	103,082	125,900		22,818
Ohio	344,218	314,422	29,796	
Rhode Island	16,580	9,980	6,600	
Tennessee	102,166	120,566		18,400
Texas	68,881	83,284		18,403
Wisconsin	115,101	140,500		25,399
Total			120,337	126,418
				120,337
Tilden's majority in the thirteen States				6,081

In an even apportionment of the Presidential vote, Tilden's loss on popular votes is only the trifle of 6,081. But suppose all these popular majories had been for Tilden: then his excess would have been 246,765; and the Buckalew plan would have worked out the same Presidential result. Under the True Method this majority of 246,-765 for Tilden would give him sixty-six to fifty-four for Hayes. If this does not prove the Buckalew plan to be impracticable, then I fail to comprehend clearly what an impracticability actually is.

THE TRUE METHOD.

I will next take into consideration, and explain fully and in detail the design and purposes of

THE TRUE METHOD.

Since, therefore, the Electoral system has failed, and the popular vote theory is at variance with the cherished principle of State equality upon which the Federal Government is founded, while Mr Buckalew's plan, although it is an improvement, cannot be made to adjust the Presidential vote to the popular vote in many cases, with even approximate fairness, how is the difficulty to be met? Although I use the word "difficulty," there is really nothing difficult about it. By the plan I propose, the adjustment of the Presidential vote to the popular vote of Hayes and Tilden, respectively, does not vary as much as ten popular votes except in one State. This is not *exact*, I am well aware; but many things are accepted as correct which in reality are not so. If A invest \$29 in business, B \$26 and C \$33, and they gain \$19, what is each man's *pro rata* share of the gain? The sum of the investments is \$88. Hence, multiplying each man's investment by nineteen, and dividing the quotient by eighty-eight, gives A \$6.26, B \$5.61 and C \$7.12, which sums, added together, foot up \$18.99—very near, but not exactly, the true answer. If, therefore, a variation is found in a matter involving less than one hundred dollars, does not the True Method, which so nearly approaches exactness where such vast interests are at stake, commend itself to general favor?

Following the Electoral system and the Buckalew plan, the True Method provides for Presidential votes for the several States, each to have a number equal to all its Senators and Representatives in Congress; but the True Method excels either in this: that it adjusts

the Presidential vote to the popular vote of each person voted for
with such close approximation to absolute exactness as to meet all
practical requirements. The deviations are in cases where the popu-
lar vote is so inconsiderable as that for Smith in Oregon; and, after
adjusting the Presidential to the popular vote, the odd thousandths
of a Presidential vote (which in no case can exceed nine) are added
to the quota of the person receiving the highest popular vote in the
State, except where two or more persons have an equal and the great-
est number of popular votes, and then the fraction is to be divided
equally between them.

The True Method is so simple and practical that I am surprised
to find that it has not been sooner suggested by some of the writers
who have given the subject attention. It is based upon the rule used in
the supposed case of A, B and C, a rule with which the merest tyro in
mathematics ought to be familiar. Apply that rule to the popular
and Presidential votes of Iowa, as an illustration: Hayes had 171,-
827, Tilden 112,099, Cooper 9,001, Smith 36—total, 292,963, which
latter sum represents the amount of all the *investments.* The Presi-
dential vote of the State is eleven, which represents the *profit.* Mul-
tiply Hayes' vote (171,827) by eleven, and divide the quotient by the
total vote of the State (292,963), and the answer is 6.451, which is
Hayes' quota. In the same manner Tilden's share is found to be 4.209,
Cooper's .337 and Smith's .001. These sums foot up 10.998, leaving
a fraction of .002 (two-thousandths) to be added to Hayes' share.
By this process (basing all my calculations upon the popular vote of
1876) the following tabular statement is made up:

TABLE E.

PRESIDENTIAL RESULT OF 1876 UNDER THE TRUE METHOD.

STATES.	POPULAR VOTE.*			PRESIDENTIAL VOTE.				Total.
	Hayes.	Tilden.	Cooper.	Hayes.	Tilden.	Coop'r	Sm'h.	
Alabama	68,320	106,213	......	3.914	6.086	.....	....	10
Arkansas..	38,669	58,033	211	2.394	3.593	.013	....	6
California	78,614	75,855	44	3.059	2.940	.001	....	6
Colorado.	14,154	13,316	......	1.546	1.454	.....	....	3
Conn	59,034	61,934	744	2.900	3.046	.036	.018	6
Delaware	10,691	13,379	......	1.332	1.668	.....	....	3
Florida ..	23,849	22,923	......	2.040	1.960	.....	....	4
Georgia...	49,354	129,785	......	3.030	7.970	.....	....	11
Illinois	278,232	258,601	18,421	10.516	9.772	.696	.016	21
Indiana ..	208,111	213,526	9,533	7.239	7.430	.331	....	15
Iowa	171,826	112,099	9,001	6.453	4.209	.337	.001	11
Kansas ..	78,332	37,902	7,776	3.156	1.526	.313	.005	5
Kentucky	97,490	150,108	2,003	4.670	7.192	.095	.043	12
Louisiana	95,135	70,556	......	4.594	3.406	.....	....	8
Maine....	66,300	49,914	663	3.972	2.989	.039	....	7
Maryl'd ..	71,891	91,780	......	3.516	4.484	.....	....	8
Mass	150,078	108,975	873	7.507	5.450	.043	....	13
Michigan.	166,534	141,190	9,060	5.770	4.889	.313	.028	11
Minn	72,692	48,799	2,389	2.935	1.969	.096	....	5
Miss	51,853	108,241	......	2.591	5.409	.....	....	8
Missouri .	145,029	207,077	3,492	6.112	8.730	.147	.011	15
Nebraska	31,915	17,554	2,320	1.795	.986	.130	.089	3
Nevada...	10,286	9,196	......	1.584	1.416	.....	....	3
N. Hamp.	41,522	38,440	76	2.595	2.401	.004	....	5
N. Jersey.	103,507	115,956	712	4.230	4.740	.029	.001	9
N. York...	489,505	522,043	2,039	16.863	17.986	.070	.081	35
N. Car...	106,402	122,580	......	4.646	5.354	.....	....	10
Ohio	330,689	323,182	3,057	11.047	10.794	.102	.057	22
Oregon...	15,414	14,157	510	1.539	1.411	.050	....	3
Penn	384,184	366,204	7,204	14.680	13.992	.275	.053	29
R. Island.	15,787	10,712	60	2.378	1.613	.009	....	4
S. Car...	91,870	90,906	......	3.520	3.480	.....	....	7
Tenn	89,566	133,166	......	4.825	7.175	.....	....	12
Texas ...	44,552	103,613	......	2.405	5.595	.....	....	8
Vermont..	44,091	20,354	......	3.421	1.579	.....	....	5
Virginia .	95,595	139,670	......	4.469	6.531	.....	....	11
W. Virg ..	42,698	56,455	1,373	2.123	2.809	.068	....	5
Wis.......	130,070	123,690	1,809	5.090	4.839	.070	.001	10
Total......	4,063,842	4,287,814	83,370	175.356	188.873	3.267	·404	369

*For Smith's popular vote, see Table A.

The foregoing table shows how the Presidential vote of each candidate would have footed up under the True Method.

RESULTS COMPARED.

Tilden's popular vote was 50.77 per cent and his Presidential vote 51.18 per cent. Therefore, comparing the results of 1876 under the True Method with results under the Electoral system since 1844, I am enabled to make up the following tabular statement, conclusively demonstrating the superiority of the True Method over the Electoral system, viz.:

TABLE F—*Comparing Results.*

		Per Cent Pop. Vote	Per Cent Elec. Vote	Excess.
1844—Polk ....Electoral system		49.56	62.00	12.44
1848—Taylor...............	do.	47.00	56.00	9.00
1852—Pierce	do.	51.00	85.00	34.00
1856—Buchanan............	do.	45.00	59.00	14.00
1860—Lincoln.............	do.	39.57	59.00	19.43
1864—Lincoln.............	do.	55.00	91.00	36.00
1868—Grant...............	do.	52.00	73.00	21.00
1872—Grant...............	do.	55.00	81.00	26.00
1876—Tilden............... True Method		50.77	51.18	00.41

Taking into consideration these eight Presidential elections—1844 to 1872—under the Electoral system, it will be seen that the deviation in one case (Lincoln in 1864) was as great as 36 per cent, while the nearest approach to exactness was in 1848, when Taylor's Electoral vote exceeded his popular vote nine per cent. Yet the True Method shows a deviation on Tilden's vote of only forty-one-hundredths of *one* per cent.

I find, also, that in 1840 Harrison received nearly eighty per cent of the Electoral vote, but only 52.88 per cent of the popular vote. Benton's Thirty Years' View states that Van Buren received 364,000 more popular votes in 1840 than he did in 1836. In 1836, when Van Buren received nearly 58 per cent of the Electoral vote, according to Benton's work, he ran ahead of Harrison only 14,000 popular votes. In 1840 Van Buren suffered an overwhelming Electoral defeat, receiving but little over one-fifth of that vote, yet receiving of the popular vote an excess of 364,000 over his vote in 1836.

It should be remembered, also, that in 1852, when Pierce carried all but four of the States, and received 85 per cent of the Electoral

vote, his majority was so overwhelming that the Whig party went down before such tremendous odds, never to rise again; yet of the popular vote he received only 51 per cent, showing that of every hundred votes cast by the people, 49 were Whigs.

And in 1864, when the Republican party had all the immense patronage of the Government to sustain it, the candidacy of McClellan was looked upon as simply farcical—a huge political joke. So it was, tested by the Electoral gauge; yet of the people forty-five of every hundred voted for him.

With these examples before him, surely no man will claim that the Electoral system truly indicates the strength of parties in a Presidential contest.

The following table shows the gains on the Presidential vote over the popular vote in each State by Tilden and Hayes respectively :

TABLE G—*Per Cents and Gains.*

Tilden States.	Gains in Pop. Votes.	Hayes States.	Gains in Pop. Votes.
Alabama	1.458	California	3.924
Arkansas	1.670	Colorado	1.824
Connecticut	7.886	Florida	1.961
Delaware	3.596	Illinois	
Georgia	1.379	Iowa	1.703
Indiana	2.019	Kansas	4.772
Kentucky	1.669	Louisiana	1.741
Maryland	1.786	Maine	1.771
Mississippi		Massachusetts	1.733
Missouri	3.437	Michigan	1.907
New Jersey	1.899	Minnesota	5.113
New York	1.916	Nebraska	8.364
North Carolina	1.866	Nevada	1.894
Tennessee	5.020	New Hampshire	5.783
Texas	1.430	Ohio	1.992
Virginia	1.684	Oregon	13.533
West Virginia	3.561	Pennsylvania	3.951
		Rhode Island	1.682
Total	41.306	South Carolina	3.979
		Vermont	2.230
		Wisconsin	3.931
		Total	74.588

Tilden's gains in seventeen States....................... 41.306

Gain for Hayes in all the States....................... 33.282

Which is a deviation equal to one in every 253,746. The True
Method does not claim to be absolutely correct, yet I think the above
result shows so close an approximation to exactness as to meet all
practical requirements, and to commend the True Method to favor-
able consideration and final adoption.

GENERAL REMARKS.

I had made up a hypothetical set of returns, showing how Tilden,
with a popular majority of over 400,000, would fail of an election
under the Buckalew plan, while the True Method would foot up a
Presidential majority for him of over nineteen votes; but I deem it
unnecessary to insert it. By supposing a case, I can show that the
person having the largest popular vote might not be elected under
the True Method, unless his majority was a decisive one, and he re-
ceived at least a respectable minority in all or nearly all the States.
Suppose that New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Mis-
souri, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Tennessee and Alabama had given
Tilden three-fifths of their popular votes, and each of the others had
given him two-fifths, he would have had 48,727 majority, but would
not have been elected by the True Method; and if he received *all*
the popular votes in the States named and *none* in any other State,
his majority would be 487,273, but he would not be elected: he
would fall short one full vote. Thus, it will be seen that the True
Method will prevent a combination among the most populous States
to overpower those weaker in numbers. This is the great virtue in
any system which gives the small States a greater relative influence
than the large States in electing the President.

The views herein expressed are by no means prompted by sec-
tional feelings: such would lead me to opposite conclusions.* I am
controlled therein by a lofty patriotism which would perpetuate the
principles upon which the government of Washington and Adams,

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*Under the True Method the average gain of Presidential over the popular vote
is forty-nine-hundredths of one per cent to each State in New England; in the
Pacific States thirty-five-hundredths of one per cent to each State; in the "solid
South" thirty-two-hundredths of one per cent. The loss is borne by the populous
States of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Missouri and the States of the Northwest.
The popular vote theory would allow Ohio to swallow up New England almost en-
tirely, Ohio having nearly as many votes as all the others. The Electoral system
would leave the Republican minority without a voice in the "solid South" in 1880
and thereafter, but the True Method would give that minority its proper weight in
making up the final count.

of Hancock and Jefferson, of Jay and Hamilton, is founded. Were I looking solely to the advancement of that section in which I was born, I would favor the election by popular vote, to be followed soon after by a total obliteration of State lines. Did narrow and selfish considerations alone prevail, the States of the great valley could in a brief space of time overpower all other sections. In 1876 the States of Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana cast 2,479,939 of the popular vote. These States are all washed by the mighty Father of Waters; but Ohio, Indiana, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, Texas and Alabama properly belong to the same group, and these seventeen States polled in 1876 no less than 4,097,448 votes, being 120,189 short of a majority. That they will poll more than half the popular vote in 1880 will not be doubted by any one who reaḍ carefully the statement which follows. The area of these seventeen States is 1,219,-130 square miles; that of the other twenty-one States, 869,837 square miles. Giving these seventeen States a density of population equal to that of Massachusetts (186.84 to the square mile) and they would contain a population of 227,782,249! How soon this density of population may be obtained I cannot undertake to tell; but some idea may be drawn from the fact that in 1860 these States contained 12,-373,751, and in 1870 they contained 18,824,134, an increase of 6,450,-383, or over fifty per cent. The other States had 18,784,270 in 1860, and 19,895,360 in 1870, an increase of 1,108,693, or less than seven per cent! With a like increase in both sections from 1870 to 1880, the seventeen States will contain about 29,230,000, and the twenty-one States about 20,290,000, an excess in the seventeen States of the Mississippi Valley of nearly 9,000,000! In 1876 these seventeen States had—

Of the popular vote..................................over 48.51 per cent
Of Senators in Congress............................44.73 per cent
Of Representatives in Congress.....................47.78 per cent
Of Presidential Electors............................47.15 per cent

It is not, then the people of the Mississippi Valley who need tak alarm at the possibility of the popular vote theory being adopted, but it is the people of the New England States, of New Jersey, Delaware, West Virginia, Florida, California, Nevada and Oregon who should regard with dismay any attempt to destroy the government of *States* under which we live. The next census will prove the people of the

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Mississippi Valley to be quite able to take care of themselves in any political combat in which mere numbers are to be considered.

Before dismissing this branch of the subject, I will call attention to the fact that from 1789 to 1845 all the Presidents except three (Jackson, Harrison and Taylor) and all the Vice Presidents but two (Calhoun and R. M. Johnson) came from Virginia, New York and Massachusetts. It may not unfairly be inferred, then, that the hope of carrying some particular State, which under the Electoral system might turn the scale, has had undue influence in selecting Presidential candidates. But under the True Method locality would not be an important consideration, for by its terms the minority is not swallowed up by the majority. Under the Electoral system no convention, in view of a close contest, would be likely to weigh impartially the claims of Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, or of Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, for a Presidential nomination, each being from a State with but few Electoral votes, and neither in any degree doubtful.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.*

In order to carry into effect the True Method, an amendment to the Constitution is necessary, and, therefore, I submit the following as embodying a remedy for the errors of the Electoral system, preserving to the several States the relative influence in Presidential elections that they now possess, and adjusting the Presidential vote to the popular vote of each person voted for in the several States with almost absolute exactness, besides suggesting a remedy for each of certain defects in the Constitution, viz.:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following be proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the several States, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the said Constitution, to wit:

ARTICLE XVI.

SECTION 1. Each State shall be entitled to a number of Presidential votes equal to the whole number of Senators and Representa-

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*The memorial of the author of the True Method, praying Congress to submit this amendment to the States, was presented to the Senate by Mr. Garland, and to the House by Mr. Cravens, at the extra session, October, 1877.

tives to which such State may be entitled in the Congress, and the qualified electors of each State shall vote by ballot for President and Vice President of the United States, one of whom at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves.

The Presidential votes, or fraction of a Presidential vote, to which each person voted for in any State may be entitled, shall be ascertained by multiplying the whole number of the votes of the qualified electors in said State for such person by the number of Presidential votes to which said State is entitled, and dividing the sum so obtained by the aggregate votes of the qualified electors of said State for all persons for President, using for that purpose not exceeding three decimal fractions in ascertaining the part of one Presidential vote to which such person shall be entitled; *provided*, that the fractional part of a Presidential vote remaining, after the computation as aforesaid shall have been made, shall be added to the Presidential vote of the person receiving the highest number of votes of the qualified electors of said State, so as to make up the complete Presidential vote of the State, and if two or more persons receive an equal and the highest number of votes of the qualified electors of the State, then and in that case such fractional remainder shall be divided as near as may be between such persons having an equal and the highest number of the votes of the qualified electors of the State.

SEC. 2. The Presidential vote of each State shall be ascertained in such manner, pursuant to this article, as the Legislature thereof may direct, and lists of such votes for President and Vice President shall be signed and certified by the Governor of the State, with the seal of the State thereunto attached, one of which lists, sealed and indorsed by the Governor "Presidential Votes," shall immediately be transmitted by mail to the seat of government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; and not less than ten days after the Presidential votes of such State shall have been ascertained, and within twenty days thereafter, a list of the Presidential votes of such State, sealed and indorsed as aforesaid, shall be transmitted by mail to the seat of government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. In case no list of Presidential votes shall have been received by the President of the Senate from any State prior to the first Monday in January next after the qualified electors of the several States shall have voted for Presi-

dent, it shall be the duty of the President of the Senate immediately to notify the Governor of such State that no list of Presidential votes has been received from said State, and the Governor of any State from which no list of Presidential votes shall have been received prior to said first Monday in January, shall immediately transmit, by special messenger, to be paid out of the treasury of the United States, a list of the Presidential votes of such State, signed, sealed, certified, indorsed and directed as hereinbefore required, and any Presidential votes so received by the President of the Senate shall be valid to all intents and purposes.

On a day to be designated by Congress (or, in case of disagreement between the two Houses of Congress, then upon a day to be designated by the President of the United States) which day shall not be less than fifteen days nor more than thirty days prior to the fourth day of March next after the qualified electors of the several States have voted for President of the United States, the two Houses of Congress shall meet in joint convention, and on said day the President of the Senate, as the presiding officer of said joint convention, shall, in the presence and under the direction of the two Houses of Congress, in joint convention assembled, open all packages or parcels indorsed "Presidential Votes" by the Governor of any State, and not exceeding one of such lists of Presidential votes from each State, signed and certified as in this article required, shall then and there, under the direction of the two Houses of Congress, in joint convention assembled, be counted; and the person having a majority of all the Presidential votes to which all the States are entitled shall be the President.

And if no person receive such majority, then from the two persons having the highest number of Presidential votes, except as hereinafter provided, the two Houses of Congress, in joint convention assembled, shall immediately, by *viva voce* vote, choose the President; *provided*, that if two or more persons have the next highest and an equal number of Presidential votes, the President shall be chosen in the manner herein provided for.

A quorum for the purpose of electing the President by the two Houses of Congress as herein provided for, shall consist of at least one Senator and a majority of the Representatives from two-thirds of all the States. Each Senator and each Representative shall have

one vote, and a majority of the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress shall be necessary to elect the President.

And if no election of President shall be made prior to the fourth day of March, on said day (except when said day comes on Sunday, and then on the fifth day of March) the members of the two Houses of Congress shall, by *viva voce* vote, choose the President in the manner herein provided for, and the voting shall continue from day to day until the President is elected; and the person so elected shall hold office only until the fourth day of March in the fourth year then next ensuing.

Sec. 3. The Vice President shall be elected as in this article provided for the election of the President, in all respects whatever, and the votes for Vice President shall be ascertained in the same manner and at the same time as the votes for President, and shall be tranmitted to the seat of government in the same packages with the votes for President, and shall be opened and counted at the same time and in the same manner as the votes for President.

Sec. 4. When the Vice President is tried on impeachment, the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but such Chief Justice or Associate Justice shall have no vote while presiding over an impeachment trial in any case whatever.

Sec. 5. In case of a vacancy occurring in the office of Vice President, the two Houses of Congress, within ten days after their next regular meeting and organization, shall, in joint convention assembled, choose from one of the several States a Vice President for the remainder of the then existing term; *provided*, that if such vacancy occur while Congress is in session, the two Houses of Congress, within twenty days after such vacancy occurs, shall choose a Vice President in the manner and for the time herein provided for; *and provided*, that no Senator or Representative in Congress at the time the vacancy in the office of Vice President occurs shall be chosen to fill such vacancy.

Sec. 6. The qualifications of electors for President and Vice President in each State shall be the same as the qualifications of electors for the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.

Sec. 7. The votes of the qualified electors for President and Vice President shall be cast on the same day in all the States.

CONCLUSION.

I cannot properly close without alluding in detail to the several clauses of the amendment suggested.

The first clause of section 1 provides for Presidential votes in lieu of Electors, each State to have as many as it has Senators and Representatives in Congress—thus continuing the preponderating influence of the small States in Presidential elections. Without this, no amendment could even be submitted, for, while the large States might combine in the House and get a two-thirds vote there, the Senators from thirteen of the smallest States could prevent the amendment being submitted by Congress. Three-fourths of the States being necessary to secure ratification, *ten* of the smallest would be sufficient to reject any amendment that might be proposed.

The second clause points out the mode of ascertaining the Presidential vote, so clear an explanation of which has already been given that I deem further comment unnecessary. The superiority of the True Method is that all the popular votes in a State (except where they are so inconsiderable as those for Smith in Oregon) are felt in some degree in electing the President, while under the Buckalew plan thousands are of no avail in several of the States, and under the Electoral system the voice of the minority in every State is a nullity. Under the Electoral system a change of a few hundred votes in Oregon, Nevada, Florida or South Carolina would have changed the general result of 1876.

The first clause of section 2 provides that each *State*, restricted only by the Constitution, is to ascertain its own Presidential vote; that is, by the two Houses of the Legislature, or a board of canvassers, or in any other manner it may choose.

It is also provided that only such lists of votes as are certified and signed by the Governor shall be counted; there can, then, be no doubt about what the vote of the State really was.

The two Houses of Congress must meet in joint convention to count the votes; the Senate and House would not act as independent bodies, and a "dead-lock" would be almost impossible.

The adoption of the True Method would remove many of the temptations to fraud which the Electoral system affords. A few fraudulent votes might carry a single State, and change the general result under the Electoral system; and it was charged in 1844 that

4,000 or 5,000 votes fraudulently obtained in New York for Mr. Polk gave him the vote of that State and secured his election. Whether that was so or not, I will not stop to inquire: suffice it to say that it was possible under the Electoral system, but not so under the True Method.

A failure of the people to elect the President is also provided for. Instead of *one* House electing the President in such a case, *both* Houses are to elect—one representing the *States*, the other the *people* of each *State*. The present mode of electing by the House, each State having *one* vote, is very objectionable. Thus: in five States one is a majority, in seven States two is a majority, in five other States three, and in three States four is a majority of the delegation in the House. Here are twenty States, and forty-six members from those States might elect the President, though there are 293 members in all. If Congress be called upon to elect the President under the proposed amendment, a choice must be made between the two highest on the list of those voted for, except in the possible event of two persons having a tie vote and each standing next to the highest on the list, and Senators and Representatives to have one vote each. If no choice is made by the fourth of March, members of a new Congress then come in, and the duty of electing the President devolves on them at once.

Section 3 brings the election of Vice President under the rule for the election of President. It provides for a presiding officer when the Vice President is tried on impeachment. As the law now is the Vice President would have a right to preside while *he* was on trial before the Senate on articles of impeachment. It also forbids the Chief or Associate Justice from voting while presiding in any impeachment trial. During the trial of President Johnson on impeachment Chief Justice Chase voted two or three times—the exercise of a doubtful power in the opinion of one so eminent for learning as Mr. Sumner, who entered a vigorous protest against it.

Section 3 also provides for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. For about twenty years since the Constitution went into effect next to the highest office for which it provides has been vacant, although this is not generally known, many people believing that the President of the Senate *pro tem.* is the Vice President in certain cases. The President of the Senate is a Senator, with the addi-

tional powers of a presiding officer when the Vice President is absent or his office is vacant. He votes on *all* questions, introduces bills and resolutions, or participates in debate, neither of which the Vice President can do; and the Vice President has the casting vote in case of a tie, which the President *pro tem.* has not in any case. Vice President Johnson became President on the death of Mr. Lincoln, and Mr. Foster was chosen President of the Senate *pro tem.* Had Mr. Johnson died a week after he became President, Mr. Foster would have *acted* as President until an election was held, as is provided for by the act of 1792. Had Mr. Foster been Vice President, on the death or resignation of Mr. Johnson he would have become President as fully as if he had been elected to that office.

Section 4 fixes the qualifications of voters for President, which must be the same as those of the most numerous branch of the *State* Legislature.

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Believing that the True Method, if adopted, will prevent the recurrence of any such threatening complications as those growing out of the election of 1876—which weighed like a hideous nightmare upon the business interest of the people, stifling every energy, involving thousands in financial ruin, and menacing the country with the horrors of civil war—I submit it to the candid consideration of men of all parties. Under the plan herein proposed no danger to the peace of the country can arise over a Presidential election. The rights of the States will be respected, and a fair expression of the popular voice can and will always be obtained by and through the adoption of

THE TRUE METHOD.

APPENDIX.

HOW TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION.

Article V declares that "the Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses, shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions of three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress."

It will be seen that it requires two-thirds of both Houses of Congress (each acting independently of the other) to propose an amendment. There being seventy-six Senators, fifty-one votes are necessary to propose an amendment. Taking the census of 1870 as a basis, I find that the States below named had each a population as follows:

Arkansas 481,471	Minnesota 439,706	Oregon........ 90,932
California.....560,247	Nebraska 122,963	Rhode Island..217,353
Connecticut ...537,454	Nevada 42,491	Vermont 330,551
Florida 187,748	N. Hampshire.318,300	West Virginia..442,014
Kansas 364,399		
Total 4,195,619

And the Senators from these States, with less than eleven per cent of the population, could prevent any amendment being proposed.

In the House of Representatives there are 293 members, and 196 would be a two-thirds vote.

After a resolution proposing an amendment has passed both

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Houses, even by a two-thirds vote in each, it must be presented to the President. Article 1, section 7, declares that every bill, before it become a law, shall be presented to the President, etc., and that every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

After a resolution proposing an amendment has passed, even over the President's veto, the trouble has but fairly begun.

In order to become a part of the Constitution, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of the States, and hence, with thirty-eight States in the Union, twenty-nine State Legislatures, each with two separate Houses, must ratify, or the amendment fails for the time being. If twenty-eight States should ratify, and one House in the twenty-ninth State should withhold its approval, it would be equivalent to a rejection. The States of Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island Vermont and West Virginia, with but little over seven per cent of the population in 1870, could, either by adverse action or no action at all, defeat any amendment submitted. As only fourteen or fifteen Legislatures are now in session and only two or three others to meet before November, there is little probability of any amendment being ratified until after the next Presidential election.

THE TRUE METHOD VS. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM.

[From the Pine Bluff (Ark.) Republican, Nov. 7, 1878.]

That the Electoral system has not led to anarchy and revolution is attributable to good fortune rather than to the temper of the American people. Ever since the election of Mr. Adams by the House in 1825, efforts have been made to devise some other method of electing the Chief Magistrate, but none so far has received the sanction of Congress. The True Method, as we believe, was presented to Congress by Senator Garland and to the House by Mr. Cravens at the extra session in 1877, and a majority of the House committee has submitted a proposed amendment embodying the most important

features of the original amendment prepared by the author of the True Method, but the committee's report departs from the original proposition, in that it proposes to confer upon Congress certain powers in regard to disputed votes with which no department of the Federal Government should ever be entrusted.

But we have digressed somewhat. Our object is to show a few of the crudities of the Electoral system, and how narrowly within the past half a century the country has escaped revolution under its workings. In the following tabular statement will be found the number of States choosing Electors by popular vote, number of such States received by each President, his per cents of the popular vote, of the Electoral vote, and of the Presidential vote under the True Method:

Year. President.	States Voting.	States Rec'd.	Pop. Vote.	Elect'l Vote.	Pres'l Vote.
1836—Van Buren	25	15	50.8	60.0	*52.1
1840—Harrison	25	19	52.8	82.6	53.4
1844—Polk	25	14	49.5	60.5	†49.4
1848—Taylor	29	15	47.3	58.0	47.9
1852—Pierce	30	26	50.9	88.0	50.7
1856—Buchanan	30	18	45.3	61.1	46.8
1860—Lincoln	32	17	39.9	61.1	31.7
1864—Lincoln	26	23	55.0	90.0	56.0
1868—Grant	33	25	62.6	72.7	52.2
1872—Grant	37	31	55.6	78.2	53.4
1876—Hayes	37	19	47.9	49.7	47.8

In 1836 it required an average of 4,479 popular votes to choose a Van Buren Elector; 6,518 for an opposition Elector. In the States Van Buren carried he received 476,403 popular votes, not one-third, yet these votes elected him. If he had received no popular votes in Alabama or North Carolina, his quota would have been reduced to 430,525, less than 29 per cent, and still he would have been elected.

In 1840 for a Harrison Elector, 5,460; for a Van Buren Elector, 23,035. Van Buren suffered an overwhelming Electoral defeat, yet in Maine, Maryland, New York and Pennsylvania, with ninety-two Electors, Harrison's pluralities were only 16,023; and had Van

*Van Buren required one-eighth the popular vote of South Carolina to elect him under the True Method. †Polk required nearly two-thirds.

Buren taken from Harrison 202 votes in Maine, 2,389 in Maryland 5,300 in New York, and 175 in Pennsylvania, he would have been re-elected, though Harrison would have led him 130,000 popular votes.

In 1844 a change of 2,556 from Polk to Clay would have elected the latter.

It required 8,332 popular votes in 1848 for a Taylor Elector; for a Cass Elector, 10,344.

In 1852 Pierce received 254 of the 296 Electors. Yet changes of 17,100 popular votes in six States, with 107 Electors, would have elected Scott. Popular votes to a Pierce Elector, 6,286; to a Scott Elector, 33,013.

In 1856 for a Buchanan Elector, 11,074; for a Fremont Elector, 11,766; for a Fillmore Elector, 109,317.

In 1860 the per cents of popular and Electoral votes and the ratios of popular votes to one Elector were as follows:

	Elec. Vote.	Pop. Vote.	Ratio.
Lincoln	61.0	39.9	10,480
Breckinredge	21.7	18.1	13,243
Bell	13.2	12.6	15,078
Douglas	4.0	29.4	114,598

In 1864 an average change of thirty-five votes in every one thousand in nine States would have elected McClellan, while Lincoln's popular majority would still have been 507,000. Chance only saved the country from anarchy.

In 1868, for a Grant Elector, 14,290; for a Seymour Elector, 33,-871 popular votes.

In 1872, for a Grant Elector, 12,577; for a Greeley Elector, 42,-941 popular votes,

The contest of 1876 was the most remarkable of all. Charges of fraud were freely made, and it seemed for weeks that no result could be reached. If no fraud was committed, Hayes owes his election to the vote of Florida, where he received nearly 510 in every 1,000 popular votes; hence, a change of five votes in every thousand from Hayes to Tilden would have given Florida to Tilden, and secured his election. A thousand popular votes in Florida would have been of more avail to Tilden than the million and three hundred thousand he received in Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and

Wisconsin. South Carolina is a more striking illustration, for changes of twenty-seven in every ten thousand would have elected Tilden.

Can any one imagine greater temptation to fraud than the Electoral system offered in the Florida or South Carolina case? Not to have yielded to it required the highest order of integrity, the loftiest patriotism, the greatest self-denial and the most heroic courage. We are not surprised if frauds were committed; the Electoral system admits of the most stupendous frauds. Therefore we insist that the system ought to be abolished and the True Method adopted.

THE TRUE METHOD OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES—OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM CONSIDERED.

New Orleans, January 22, 1880.

To the Editor of the Democrat:

I see by late news from Washington that the House Committee on the state of the law respecting the ascertainment and declaration of the result of election of President and Vice President are about reporting a joint resolution in favor of so amending the Constitution as to abolish the Electoral Colleges and to substitute therefor a direct vote of the people, and providing that each State shall continue to have, as now, a number of votes for President equal to its whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress, and providing further that the vote of each person voted for in any State shall be ascertained by multiplying his popular vote in the State by the State's Electoral vote and dividing the result by the total popular vote of the State, for which purpose three decimal fractions may be used in ascertaining the fraction of a Presidential vote to which any person voted for in any State may be entitled.

So far as the manner of voting for President by the people of the States directly is concerned, and also in the manner of ascertaining the vote in each State of any person voted for, the plan of the House Committee is for all practical purposes the same as that embodied in my petition to Congress in October, 1877, which was presented to the Senate by Mr. Garland, of Arkansas, and to the House by Mr. Cravens, of the same State. (See Congressional Record, extra session, 1877.) Before attempting to point out the superiority of the

True Method over the Electoral system, I will submit a tabular state-
ment showing the difference in the results under each, respectively,
at previous elections:

	Pop. Vote.	Electoral System. Elec. Vote.	True Method. Elec. Vote.
1824—Pennsylvania—Jackson	36,100	28	21.35
Adams...........	5,440	..	3.21
Crawford	4,206	..	2.49
Clay	1,609	..	0.95
Total	47,355	28	28.00
1844—Massachusetts—Polk	52,486	..	4.83
Clay	67,478	12	6.18
Birney	10,800	..	0.99
Total	131,064	12	12.00
1860—Pennsylvania—Lincoln	268,030	27	15.20
Douglas	16,765	..	0.95
Breckinredge	178,871	..	10.13
Bell.............	12,776	..	0.72
Total	476,442	27	27.00

Referring to the election of 1876, I submit the following by way
of comparing the Electoral system with the True Method:

	Popular Vote.	Electoral System. Elec. Vote	True Method Elector'l Vote
Alabama—Tilden	102,002	10	5.992
Hayes................	68,230	..	4.008
Delaware—Tilden	13,381	3	1.664
Hayes..................	10,752	..	1.336
Texas—Tilden	104,755	8	5.604
Hayes...................	44,800	..	2.396
Iowa—Tilden	112,099	..	4.203
Hayes	171,327	11	6.426
Cooper	9,901	..	0.371
Wisconsin—Tilden	128,927	..	4.838
Hayes	130,668	10	5.104
Cooper	1,509	..	0.058

Taking the foregoing five States by way of illustration, I find that
Tilden received 456,164 popular votes, Hayes 419,777, and Cooper
11,410—the Electoral system giving Tilden 21, Hayes 21, and Cooper

nothing; but the True Method would give Tilden 22.301, Hayes 19.270, and Cooper .429.

Before proceeding to any further consideration of the merits of the True Method, I beg leave to direct attention to a few of the most striking objections to the system under which Presidents have been elected since 1804. For this purpose allow me to refer to the mode pointed out by the Constitution for the election of President. Article II, section 1, declares that "each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress," etc. That the provision for the appointment of Electors was founded in distrust of the people is firmly maintained by some writers, and vehemently denied by others. But be that as it may, a distrust of the people was not the only reason for the adoption of a system giving certain States a greater relative influence in the election of President than other States. Had a distrust of the people been the moving cause, Electors would have been made to correspond with the number of Representatives in Congress to which each State might be entitled. Had such a system been adopted, the difference in the voting power of the several States at the first election for President would have been as follows:

States.	Representatives.	Per Cent.	Electors.	Per Cent
New Hampshire	3	4.60	5	5.5
Massachusetts	8	12.30	10	11.0
Rhode Island	1	1.54	3	3.3
Connecticut	5	7.70	7	7.7
New York	6	9.24	8	8.8
New Jersey	4	6.16	6	6.6
Pennsylvania	8	12.32	10	11.0
Delaware	1	4.60	3	3.3
Maryland	6	9.24	8	8.8
Virginia	10	15.40	12	13.0
North Carolina	5	7.77	7	7.7
South Carolina	5	7.77	7	7.7
Georgia	3	4.60	5	5.5

From the foregoing it will be seen that Connecticut, North Carolina and South Carolina exercised the same voting power under the system adopted as under the system basing Electors upon the number of Representatives only; but under the supposed plan the States

of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware and Georgia would have had their voting power reduced from 24.17 per cent to 18.46—a difference against them of 23.62 per cent, and Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia would have had their voting power increased from 52.74 per cent to 58.46—a difference in their favor of 10.84. It will scarcely be questioned, then, that at least one object sought in the adoption of the Electoral system was to give the small States greater relative power in electing President, than the more populous States, to the end that those weaker in numbers might not be overpowered by combinations among the large States. This is the only merit the Electoral system ever had, and the True Method proposes to retain that feature.

It is claimed by the friends of the Electoral system, but I think without any very forcible reason, that it was the design of the framers of the Constitution that, in order to maintain the entity of the States its votes should all be cast for the same persons for President and Vice President. If such was their intention, many of the framers of our organic law lived to see that design frustrated, for at the first election only three of the ten States voting gave a solid vote for President and Vice President; at the third election eleven of the sixteen States voted solidly for President; the plan of nominations by Congressional caucusses tended still further to solidify the votes of the States, and at each election since parties have designated nominees by national conventions Presidential Electors have only performed ministerial duties, and the votes of States have generally been cast solidly for the nominees of the dominant party at the State election for Presidential Electors. Another reason for my belief that it was not the original design that the States were to give a solid vote for President, is that Senators are required to be so classified that those from any given State shall belong to different classes, and it will not be claimed, I opine, that because the States are not allowed to elect their Senators *in solido* that their sovereignty is in any degree infringed upon. Owing to the classification of Senators, as prescribed by article I, section 3, the States of Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Louisiana and California have each one Democratic and one Republican Senator. As a further reason for my opinion that the solidity of the State was not contemplated is that section 4 of article I confers upon Congress certain powers in connection with the elec-

tion of Senators and Representatives, and pursuant thereto States having more than one Representatives are required by law to be divided into suitable districts for the choice of Representatives in Congress; and pursuant to an act of Congress one House of a State Legislature cannot prevent the election of a Senator in Congress by refusing to go into joint convention, as was frequently the case before the act alluded to was passed. But for the district system the present House of Representatives would contain over 160 Republicans of the 293 members.

I have enlarged somewhat upon my views concerning the original design of our forefathers in the adoption of the Electoral system, and I shall next endeavor to show that a departure from that design has rendered that system not only useless, but an instrument which may be used at any time to thwart the will of the people by corrupt partisan agencies. It is alleged by a committee of the House, appointed to investigate the subject, that such frauds were committed in Florida and Louisiana as to give the Electoral votes of those States to Mr. Hayes, when in fact Mr. Tilden received a majority of the popular vote in each.

It will be remembered that the award of the Electoral Commission was 185 for Hayes and 184 for Tilden. Therefore, leaving Louisiana out of the count, the vote of Florida turned the scale, for had that State's four votes been awarded to Tilden, he would have had 188 votes to 181 for Hayes. There was, therefore, the greatest possible temptation to fraud; the Presidency was at stake, with the immense patronage it commands, amounting probably to a hundred million dollars in a single term of four years; and it was only necessary to operate either upon the ignorance or the cupidity of a few men to stifle the voice of the American people, and render nugatory the solemn acts of sovereign States. Inveigh as we may against the perpetrators of frauds, a system that offers opportunity for their perpetration with impunity is certainly at fault, and ought to be changed.

Another objection to the Electoral system is that a Presidential contest. where parties are as nearly divided equally as they are now, is practically confined to a few pivotal States. The contest next fall will most certainly depend upon the votes of Indiana and New York. The party which can carry both those States is certain of gaining the Presidential prize. Party platforms will be constructed to meet the

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views of those two States; candidates most likely to win popular favor in those States will be advanced to the front, without proper regard to general fitness, and all the corrupting influences which partisan rancor and a love of spoils can evoke will be centered in New York and Indiana, and in effect those two States will elect the next President, as they hold the balance of power.

Again : Under the provision of the Constitution empowing the Legisature of each State to point out the manner of choosing Presidential Electors, it is gravely proposed in New York State that the Legislature pass an act providing for the election of two Presidential Electors for the State at large and one for each of the thirty-three districts. There being at present nine Democratic and twenty-four Republican districts, the Republicans rely upon carrying at least twenty of the districts, even though the Democrats may succeed in carrying the State. But the Republican Legislature of New York may even go so far as to provide by law for the appointment of the Electors by the Legislature, in which case it would only be necessary for the sitting members of that body to convene on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November next and choose thirty-five Republican Electors, and no legal objection could be urged, even though the State might be Democratic, for the system against which I have warred in my feeble way for the past two or three years admits of such proceedings. Ohio may follow in the wake of New York; first, however, redistricting the State, and so gerrymandering the districts as to give the Republicans ten or eleven, instead of the nine districts they now hold; and it is in the power of the Ohio Legislature to take upon itself the choice of the Electors, and if both New York and Ohio should determine to allow their Legislatures to choose the Electors, all eyes would be directed with increased interest to the next national Republican convention, for the nominees of that body would be certain of election.

Still another objection to the Electoral system is found in the mode of choosing the President by the House in case the Colleges fail to elect. As the House now stands no President would likely be chosen by that body, for each State in such case has one vote. The Democrats have the sixteen Southern States, together with Ohio and Oregon, eighteen in all—twenty being required. The Republicans have nineteen States; Indiana has six Democrats, six Republicans

and one Greenbacker. Should the election devolve upon the House, the Indiana Greenbacker would have it in his power to join the Republicans and give them a majority of the delegation, and Indiana, added to the States the Republicans now have, would elect their nominee. On the other hand, if he voted otherwise than for the Republican no election could be had as parties in the House now stand. The Senate, however, being Democratic, would choose the nominee of that party for Vice President, and the duties of the Presidential office would devolve upon him. A case occurred in 1825 in which the solitary Representative from Missouri decided the great issue of the Presidency between John Quincy Adams and John C. Calhoun. As is well known, the election of 1824 for President devolved upon the House, Andrew Jackson, J. Q. Adams and Wm. H. Crawford being the only persons eligible. There were twenty-four States then in the Union—thirteen being a majority; and the vote of the Missouri Representative turned the scale in favor of Mr. Adams, who had twelve votes without Missouri. Had the gentleman from Missouri persisted in voting against Mr. Adams no election by the House would have been had, and Mr. Calhoun, who had been elected Vice President by the Electoral Colleges, would have been *ex-officio* President. But in view of the election of President by the House, the action of that body upon two contested cases now pending possesses unusual interest at present. The seat of a Republican from Indiana is contested by a Democrat, and a Republican holds a seat as Representative from Minnesota which is claimed by a Democrat. Should these contests be decided in favor of the Democratic contestants, it would add two States to the Democrats and enable them to elect their nominee should the election devolve upon the House.

None of the complications and dangers which the Electoral system admits of apply at all to the True Method, and I am convinced, after devoting much time and labor to the investigation of the subject, that any such difficulty as threatened the peace of the country in 1877 is impossible under the amendment to the Constitution which the House Committee has had in charge since the session of December, 1877. The True Method provides for an election by a direct vote of the people, and gives due weight to every vote cast, while under the Electoral system in more than half the States voting for Presidential Electors is only a matter of form. Under the True Method the States

retain the right they now possess of declaring the qualifications of voters; the result in each State is to be finally decided by its own tribunals, and only votes certified to by the Governor, with the State seal attached, are to be counted; the two Houses of Congress (instead of acting independently of each other and passing upon the validity of the votes of a State) are to meet in joint convention to witness the count. It admits of no dead-lock such as that which presented so threatening an aspect in 1877. It recognizes every right to which any State may justly lay claim, and maintains the greater relative power of the small States in electing the President, in order that combinations of the most populous States may not exert an undue and pernicious influence in choosing the President. Under the Electoral system a fraud perpetrated in a single State may change its vote, and by such fraudulent action the entire result may be changed. As is generally believed, the wrongful throwing out of votes in Florida made Hayes President; but with the identical popular votes upon which the Electoral Commission acted, Tilden would have been elected, and any attempt to carry the last Presidential election by fraud would have involved (under the True Method) the wrongful change of over one hundred thousand votes from the Democratic to the Republican column, and, instead of being confined to a few localities, corrupting agencies would have been necessary in nearly every State.

The subject under consideration is one of the greatest possible interest to the whole American people, and should engage the earnest attention of the press, of statesmen, and of the people generally.

<div align="right">AUGUSTUS D. JONES.</div>

A POPULAR VOTE FOR PRESIDENT.

Mr. Townsend (Democrat) of Illinois has introduced in the House a joint resolution to amend the Constitution so that the President and Vice President of the United States shall be elected by a majority of the people. Many as are the objections to the Electoral system, the popular vote theory is such a dangerous step in the direction of centralization that Democrats adhering to the opinions of Jefferson, of Jackson, of Benton, and of Calhoun, can only contemplate Mr. Townsend's proposition with surprise and sentiments as nearly allied to disrespect as the gravity of the subject and a decent regard

for the opinions of the gentleman from Illinois will permit. It is not within the line of legitimate argumentation to question any gentleman's sincerity, nor is it decorous to meet even a fallacious position by an attempt at ridicule. Hence, Mr. Townsend's proposition must stand or fall on its own merits.

In order to reach any fair analysis of the gentleman's proposition it is first necessary to glance at the nature of the Federal Government and the relations which the States bear to it.

That no consolidated government was intended by the framers of the Constitution is conclusively shown in every line and word of the fundamental law upon which the Union is based, unless it be the preamble, upon the words of which, and upon these only, the friends of consolidation base their fallacious and dangerous political heresy. The preamble recites that—

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, * * * do ordain and establish this Constitution," etc.

It should be noticed in this connection that the present Constitution superseded the Articles of Confederation, wherein it was declared that "in determining questions in the United States, in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote."

This was regarded as not so perfect a Union as was deemed advisable, and hence the present Constitution provided for a *more perfect* Union; that is, a Union more perfect than that which held the States together during the war of the revolution and until it was succeeded by the more perfect Union provided for by the Constitution. Had a *perfect* Union been provided for, the preamble would have said so, and it could not have been left optional with the States of the Confederation to join the more perfect Union. But that the States had the right to adhere to the Articles of Confederation or join the more perfect Union, is clearly proved by article VII of the Constitution, which delares that the ratifications of the conventions (not the people) of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution *between the States so ratifying the same.*

Had a consolidation of all the States been contemplated, "we, the people," would have declared that a ratification of the Constitution by a majority of the people of the United States should give that instrument full force and validity. But "we, the people," did not make the present Constitution, for in the convention which framed it each

State had one vote; in its ratifiaction each State had one vote, and in the ratification of the several amendments thereto each State had one vote. "Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the STATES present" is the superscription to the charter of our liberties which immediately precedes the signature of Geo. Washington as President and Deputy from Virginia. It is a historical fact that on the seventeenth of September, 1787, the Constitution was adopted, and on the seventh of December following little Delaware, in the exercise of a sovereignty won by the valor of Washington and Lafayette, of Warren and Marion, was the first to give in her adherence to the new Constitution. Other States followed until the twenty-first of June, 1788, when the ratification by New Hampshire (the ninth State) gave effect to the Constitution "between the States so ratifying the same;" but it had no more validity in the States of Virginia, New York, North Carolina and Rhode Island than if it had never been adopted.

So there can be no question but that this government of the United States is nothing more than a government of States; the several States comprising the Union retaining all the rights they had under the Confederation except such as have been delegated to the Federal Government. (See Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.")

Among the rights not merely reserved, but expressly guaranteed, is (see article V) that "no State shall, without its consent, be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." This provision is an important factor in the matter of electing the President, for article II declares that each State shall appoint a number of Electors equal to its whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress. It cannot escape the notice of the most casual observer that the framers of the Constitution intended to give the smaller States greater relative power in the choice of President than States of greater numerica strength. But Mr. Townsend's proposition contemplates a total disregard of State lines, and by grouping the people of all the States into one community, each State would lose its entity, and those weak in numbers would be reduced to the condition of obscure counties or parishes in a State. That the adoption of Mr. Townsend's proposition would operate with crushing effect upon at least thirteen of the States is clearly susceptible of demonstration, basing calculations

upon the popular and Electoral votes of 1876, as the following tabular statement will show:

States.	Electors.	Popular Votes.	States.	Electors.	Popular Votes
Arkansas	6	97,029	Nevada	3	19,691
Colarado	3	27,474	N. Hampshire	5	80,124
Delaware	3	24,133	Oregon	3	29,865
Florida	4	47.792	Rhode Island	4	26,567
Kansas	5	124,000	Vermont	5	64,346
Maine	7	116,786	West Virginia	5	100,526
Nebraska	3	51,790		—	
Total				56	810,123
Per cent				15.17	9.60

Showing a loss in the voting power of these thirteen States, should Mr. Townsend's scheme be adopted, of over 36 per cent.

These thirteen States are cited by way of illustration, because they have twenty-six of the seventy-six Senators, and could prevent the proposed amendment from receiving the requisite two-thirds vote in the Senate. But, improbable as it appears, should Mr. Townsend's amendment pass both Houses of Congress, a still greater difficulty would present itself, for it requires the ratifications of three-fourths of all the States to give validity to this amendment, and adverse action, or even non-action, by any ten of these would put an effectual quietus upon the proposition. Pending action upon his proposed measure, should Mr. Townsend ever appear before the people of either of the following States, he might be called upon to rise and explain:

States.	Electors.	Popular Votes.	States.	Electors.	Popular Votes
Arkansas	6	97,029	Nevada	3	19,691
Colorado	3	27,474	N. Hampshire	5	80,124
Delaware	3	24,133	Oregon	3	29,865
Florida	4	47,792	Rhode Island	4	26,567
Nebraska	3	51,790	Vermont	5	64,346
Total				39	468,811
Per cent				10.57	5.56

Showing a loss in the voting power of these ten States of 47.4 per cent. In view of these incontestible facts, there is not a ghost of a chance for the Townsend proposition.

THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNT.

As is well known to the general public, the Electoral system of choosing Presidents allows each State a number of Electors equal to its whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress; the Electors are to be chosen in each State in such manner as its Legislature may direct, and by a general understanding the Electors perform only ministerial duties. Hence, the political party which may be able to choose the Electors, even by a plurality of the popular vote, counts the entire Electoral vote of the State. Under the Electoral system Presidents have been chosen since the first election of Washington in 1789; but to guard against another such crisis as was presented by the tie vote between Jefferson and Burr, in 1801, the system was amended so as to require Electors to vote in separate ballots for President and Vice President. It seems clear to our mind that the original design of the framers of the Constitution was that Electors should exercise some discretion or judgment in the choice of the President; but that design was departed from to a greater or less extent until 1836, since which time, except on one or two occasions, and then only in a few instances, the dominant party in each State has counted the entire vote. The practice of voting *in solido* has led to many incongruous results, and in 1876-77 brought the country to the verge of anarchy. That some amendment to the Constitution was necessary to obviate any such complications in the future seemed apparent to every thoughtful mind, and accordingly, early in 1877, Augustus D. Jones, a journeyman printer, then a citizen of Arkansas, but now residing in this city, prepared, under the title of "True Method of Electing the President," etc., a volume reviewing the Electoral system, the Buckalew plan and the popular vote theory, and at the same time submitting a plan which he called "The True Method," and explaining its purposes. The True Method follows the Electoral system only so far as to allow each State a number of votes for President equal to all its Senators and Representatives in Congress; but instead of allowing the dominant party in a State to control all its votes for President, every person voted for is to have the same proportion of the Presidential votes as he receives of the popular vote, three decimals to be used in ascertaing the fraction of a vote received. To illustrate, let us apply the Electoral sys-

tem and the True Method, respectively, to the vote of Louisiana for Governor last fall, assuming that Mr. Wiltz and Mr. Beattie had been opposing candidates for the Presidency. The vote for Wiltz was 72,-610; for Beattie, 41,460; total, 114,070.

Louisiana has eight votes for President, and under the Electoral system Mr. Wiltz, who received the highest number of votes, would have received the whole number. But not so under the method prepared by Mr. Jones, and embodied in a memorial of that gentleman which was submitted to the Senate by Mr. Garland and to the House by Mr. Cravens at the extra session of Congress in October, 1877, and which is now under consideration in the House. The True Method provides that each State shall have a number of Presidential votes equal to its Senators and Representatives in Congress; that the people shall vote directly for President, and that the proportion of each person's Presidential vote shall be ascertained by multiplying his popular vote by the State's Electoral vote and dividing the product by the total popular vote of the State. Applying the True Method to the vote for Governor of Louisiana last fall, we should multiply the vote for wiltz (72,610) by the State Electoral vote (8), which would give 580,880; divide this by the whole vote of the State (114,070) and the result would show 5.092 votes for Wiltz. In the same manner the portion to which Mr. Beattie was entitled would be ascertained. To give a practical illustration of the workings of both the Electoral system and the True Method, we have prepared a tabular statement showing what the result would have been under each system in each State, basing our calculations upon the last State elections, and assuming that the votes given had been cast for Presidential Electors:

States.	Electors.		True Method.	
	D.	R.	D.	R.
Alabama, Governor, 1876..............	10	....	6.410	3.590
Arkansas, Congress, 1878	6	....	2.404	1.163
California, Governor, 1879	....	6	1.681	2.546
Colorado, Supreme Judge, 1779.........	....	3	1.234	1.644
Connecticut, Governor, 1878	....	6	2.657	2.932
Delaware, Governor, 1878	3	....	2.382	....
Florida, Congress, 1878...............	4	....	2.166	1.834
Georgia, Congress, 1878	11	....	9.526	.319
Illinois, Treasurer, 1878	....	21	7.914	10.025
Indiana, Secretary of State, 1878	15	....	7.335	6.534
Iowa, Governor, 1879	....	11	3.209	5.946
Kansas, Governor, 1878	....	5	1.345	2.676
Kentucky, Governor, 1879.............	12	....	6.660	4.334
Louisiana, Governor, 1879.............	8	....	5.076	2.924
Maine, Governor, 1879................	....	7	1.393	3.479
Maryland, Governor, 1879.............	8	....	4.557	3.433
Massachusetts, Governor, 1879.........	....	13	2.474	6.559
Michigan, Supreme Judge, 1879........	....	11	5.275	5.725
Minnesota, Governor, 1879	....	5	1.996	2.702
Mississippi, Congress, 1878	8	....	5.755	.340
Missouri, Congress, 1878	15	....	8.348	2.760
Nebraska, Supreme Judge, 1879........	....	3	.871	1.929
Nevada, Governor, 1878...............	....	3	1.458	1.542
New Hampshire, Governor, 1878........	....	5	2.049	2.512
New Jersey, Assembly, 1879............	9	....	4.429	4.352
New York, Lieutenant Governor, 1879....	....	35	17.487	17.513
North Carolina, Congress, 1878.........	10	....	5.263	4.030
Ohio, Governor, 1879	....	22	10.491	11.055
Oregon, Congress, 1878...............	3	....	1.498	1.395
Pennsylvania, Treasurer, 1879..........	....	29	12.079	15.259
Rhode Island, Governor, 1879..........	....	4	1.407	2.482
South Carolina, Congress, 1878.........	7	....	4.912	1.913
Tennessee, Congress, 1878.............	12	....	8.570	2.809
Texas, Congress, 1878................	8	....	6.214	.700
Vermont, Governor, 1878..............	....	5	1.487	3.218
Virginia, Congress, 1878..............	11	....	8.135	2.572
West Virginia, Congress, 1878..........	5	....	2.551	1.055
Wisconsin, Congress, 1878.............	....	10	3.969	5.319
Total	165	204	185.853	148.440

To the regular Democratic vote in Massachusetts we have added only one-third the Butler vote, showing a Democratic strength of 46,-372, which is not an unfair estimate, as Tilden received over 108,000 in the old Bay State in 1876.

To the regular Democratic vote in Maine one-third the Greenback vote is added, making 27,531, which is warranted by the fact that Maine gave Tilden 49,917 votes.

In all cases where an independent Democrat ran against the regular

nominee, the vote for both has been assigned to the Democratic column. The votes and percentages under the two systems may be seen by reference to the following tabular statement:

Parties.	Elec'l System.		True Method.	
	Votes.	Per Cent.	Votes.	Per Cent
Democratic	165	44.72	185.853	50.36
Republican	204	55.28	148.440	40.23
Greenback and others............	....	....	34.707	9.41
Total	369	....	369.000	....

In the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin. Minnessta, Iowa, Nebraska and Kansas, in which the Democrats would have had no show under the Electoral system, the True Method would have given them 63.963 votes; and in the doubtful States of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Colorado, Nevada and California the Democrats would have received 39.437 votes under the True Method, giving that party almost a certainty of over one hundred votes, sixty-four of which they have no hope of obtaining under the Electoral system, besides nearly forty which are exceedingly doubtful. On the other hand, the Republicans would have received 41.678 votes in the States of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana and Oregon.

HOW THE STATES VOTED.

STATES	1856.	1860.	1864.	1868.	1872.	1876.	STATES	1856.	1860.	1864.	1868.	1872.	1876.	STATES	1856.	1860.	1864.	1868.	1872.	1876.
Ala...	d	d	x	r	r	d	La ...	d	d	x	d	x	r	N. C..	d	d	x	r	r	d
Ark ..	d	d	x	r	x	d	Me ...	r	r	r	r	r	r	Ohio.	r	r	r	r	r	r
Cal..	d	r	r	r	r	r	Md...	†	d	r	d	d	d	Oreg.		r	r	d	r	r
Col...	..	..	..	..	..	r	Mass.	r	r	r	r	r	r	Penn.	d	r	r	r	r	r
Conn	r	r	r	r	r	d	Mich.	r	r	r	r	r	r	R. I...	r	r	r	r	r	r
Del ...	d	d	d	d	r	d	Min ...	..	r	r	r	r	S. C..	d	d	x	r	r	r
Fla ...	d	d	x	r	r	r	Miss .	d	d	x	x	r	d	Tenn.	d	b	x	r	d	d
Ga..	d	d	x	d	d	d	Mo....	d	d	r	r	d	d	Texas	d	d	x	x	d	d
Ills..	d	r	r	r	r	r	Neb....	..	..	..	r	r	r	Vt ...	r	r	r	r	r	r
Ind..	d	r	r	r	r	d	Nev....	..	..	r	r	r	r	Va ..	d	b	x	x	r	d
Ia ..	r	r	r	r	r	r	N. H.	r	r	r	r	r	r	W. V.	..	..	r	r	r	d
Kan	..	..	r	r	r	r	*N. J.	d	†	d	d	r	d	Wis..	r	r	r	r	r	r
Ky.	d	b	d	d	d	d	N. Y..	r	r	r	d	r	d							
No. of States voting.......................................															13	33	25	34	35	38

NOTE.—For Democrat, d; for Republican, r; for Bell. b. *New Jersey gave Lincoln four and Douglas three votes in 1860. Maryland voted for Fillmore in 1856. Those marked x were either excluded from the count or held no election.

THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE.

The following statement shows how the count would stand in a vote by the House of Representatives for President, each State having one vote; also, how the Senate would stand on a vote for Vice President, each Senator having one vote:

STATES.	H. R. D.	H. R. R.	SEN. D.	SEN. R.	STATES.	H. R. D.	H. R. R.	SEN. D.	SEN. R.	STATES.	H. R. D.	H. R. R.	SEN. D.	SEN. R.
Alabama...	1	...	2	..	Louisiana..	1	..	1	1	N. Carolina.	1	..	2	..
Arkansas..	1	...	2	..	Maine	..	1	..	2	Ohio.......	1	..	2	..
California .	..	1	1	1	Maryland .	1	..	2	..	Oregon ...	1	..	2	..
Colorado...	...	1	...	2	Mass......	..	1	..	2	Penn	..	1	1	1
Conn	..	1	1	1	Mich......	..	1	..	2	R. Island..	..	1	..	2
Delaware ..	1	...	2	..	Minn	..	1	..	2	S. Carolina	1	..	2	..
Florida	1	...	2	..	Miss......	1	..	1	1	Tennessee.	1	..	2	..
Georgia....	1	...	2	..	Missouri ..	1	..	2	..	Texas.....	1	..	2	..
Illinois	..	1	*	1	Neb.......	..	1	..	2	Vermont...	..	1	..	2
Indiana	†	†	2	...	Nevada...	..	1	..	2	Virginia....	1	..	2	..
Iowa.......	..	1	...	2	N. Hamp.	..	1	..	2	W. Virginia	1	..	2	..
Kansas	..	1	...	2	N. Jersey.	..	1	2	..	Wisconsin.	..	1	..	2
Kentucky ..	1	..	2	...	New York..	..	1	1	1					
Total..										18	19	42	33.

*Senator Davis, of Illinois, is classed as an Independent. †A Greenbacker has the casting vote in the Indiana House delegation.